Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes by Fiore, Annamaria
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Experimental Economics: Some
Methodological Notes
Annamaria Fiore
January 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12498/
MPRA Paper No. 12498, posted 5. January 2009 06:40 UTC
  
 
 
Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes  
 
 
 
 
 
ANNAMARIA FIORE
∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preliminary draft 
This version: January 2009 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this work is presenting in a self-contained paper some methodological aspects as they are 
received in the current experimental literature. The purpose has been to make a critical review of 
some very influential papers dealing with methodological issues. In other words, the idea is to have a 
single paper where people first approaching experimental economics can find summarised (some) of 
the most important methodological issues. In particular, the focus is on some methodological 
practises still debated in experimental literature, such as attainment of control in experimental 
settings, subject pool, incentive mechanisms, repeated trials and learning. The hope is that increasing 
awareness on some sharing methodologies will improve the robustness of results in this research 
field. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, Economics has been established as science in 1776, coinciding with 
the  publication of  “Inquiry into Nature and Causes of the Wealth of The Nations” 
by Adam Smith. Until very recently, however, Economics was not considered an 
experimental science, but rather an observational science akin to astronomy. For a 
long time, J. S. Mill’s “On the Definition of Political Economy” (1844; 1874) pulled 
its rank on this concept. Mill was a radical empiricist, and persuaded that the 
primary source of knowledge was obtained in an inductive way from the sense 
experience. Notwithstanding this, he accorded a dispensation to social sciences in 
general for the impossibility of using experimental method, and a dispensation to 
political economy in particular, for its special subject of inquiry. This view is also 
echoed in M. Friedman’s words (1953)1: 
   
“Unfortunately, we can seldom test particular predictions in the social sciences by experiments 
explicitly designed to eliminated what are judged to be the most important disturbing 
influences. Generally, we must rely on evidence cast up by the “experiments” that happen to 
occur […] The necessity of relying on uncontrolled experience rather than on controlled 
experiment makes it difficult to produce dramatic and clear-cut evidence to justify the 
acceptance of tentative hypothesis”.  
 
While he admits the importance of collection of data under ceteris paribus 
conditions for the development of a science, at the same time Friedman generally 
denies the status of  experimental science to economics, partly because he does not 
consider this aspect relevant for the distinction between natural and social sciences, 
partly because he concedes a particular degree of difficulty to economics, given its 
proper contents: 
 
“… the fact that economics deals with the interrelations of human beings, and that the 
investigator is himself part of the subject matter being investigated in a more intimate sense 
than in physical sciences, raises special difficulties in achieving objectivity at the same time 
that it provides the social scientist with a class of data not available to the physical scientist”.  
 
We can trace exactly the same ideas even more recently, bearing witness to a 
common view of considering economics not to be among the experimental 
disciplines: “One possible way of figuring out economic laws … is by controlled 
experiment… Economists [unfortunately]… cannot perform the controlled 
experiments of chemists or biologists because they cannot easily control other 
important factors. Like astronomers or meteorologists, they generally must be 
content largely to observe” (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985, as cited by D. Friedman 
and Sunder, 1994)2. 
 
                                               
1
 To get a general idea of the conventional wisdom about the experimental status of economics at 
the outset of the discipline, we can also refer to Chamberlin (1948,  p.95). 
 
2 Also note Lipsey’s pessimistic note regarding experiments in economics, An Introduction to 
Positive Economics, 1979.    
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But, as D. Friedman and Sunder (1994) point out, once some methodological 
procedures and techniques have been repeatedly used and firmly established in 
conducting experiments in a particular discipline, this discipline begins to be 
considered also an experimental science. Based on this, we may now say with some 
confidence that economics is an experimental science and that economics 
experiments have became an useful and irreplaceable research tool. And there have 
been even some authors that have not boggled at stating that “experimental 
economics has been the protagonist of one of the most stunning methodological 
revolutions in the history of science” (Guala, unpublished paper).  
 
2. A Historical Perspective  
First experiment run in economic field dates back to 1931 (if we do not take into 
account the St. Petersburg paradox, 1738), when Thurstone tried to determine 
empirically individual indifference curves. His experimental design was rather naïve 
and  based on hypothetical questions, and it attracted critics soon afterwards. It is 
indicative that the first critical review of this work was given by M. Friedman, in 
conjunction with Wallis, 1942, about the reliability or not of experimental data, the 
so called “artificiality critique” (see Section 7.1).  
What is relevant here it is that at this criticism a similar experiment followed up, 
constructed by Rousseas and Hart (1951), in which they tried to meet objections. 
Hence, even in the very first steps, a feature emerges that then will become a 
constant in experimental economics: the knowledge is being cumulated and 
experimental works build upon one another. In this respect, it is not possible 
consider any experiment in isolation, but rather as being part of a cumulative 
process, a system of experiments related to each other (Roth, 1988) or, as Kagel and 
Roth (1992, p.1390) note: “experimental methods allow investigators to re-examine 
one another’s conclusion relatively easily, and this is an important factor in the 
vitality of the experimental enterprise”.  
This probably may have concurred in establishing a not complete and systematic 
methodology for some particular aspects, that is complained in some parts. To some 
extent and from a given perspective, experimental economics seems to be still a 
discipline “under construction”, subjected to continuous refinements and 
improvements, even if gradually, on some issues, a tacit consensus at the beginning, 
and a more explicit consensus afterwards, has grown up (Friedman, 1988). Two 
remarks are necessary. First, the fact that experimental economics appears to be not 
completely definite from a methodological point of view is not detrimental to itself. 
On the contrary, being a not satisfactorily explored field yet, it is fascinating and 
worthy of a  closer examination. In this connection, it is noticeable that, in the very 
last years, there have been some examples of interesting meta–experiments, in the 
sense that some experimentalists have used the methods developed in 
experimentation to test the robustness of the methods themselves. For an example, 
see Section 5.3. 
Second, this does not mean that no main point has been reached in this domain, as 
we will see in detail below.  
Going back to the historical development of the discipline in the first decades, we 
should note that the amount of works related to experiments in the economics was 
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not particularly large and systematic, even if there were very important exceptions. 
For further details, see Roth (1995) and Guala (unpublished paper). It was from the 
seventies that such a trend was destined to grow steadily. This occurred for a series 
of reasons, with the very first research programmes fully devoted to experimental 
investigation in economics (for examples in the public goods domain, see Ledyard, 
1995).  
The last decades have witnessed to an ever increasing interest related to experiments 
in economics. We should list some indications for this, as the introduction of specific 
codes of classification in the Journal of Economic Literature in the late 80s, the 
foundation of the Economic Science Association (ESA3) in 1986, the publication of 
specific textbooks (Hey, 1991; Davis and Holt, 1993; D. Friedman and Sunder, 1994; 
Kagel and Roth, 1995, D. Friedman and Cassar, 2004), the appearance of a specific 
journal devoted to it in 1998, while experimental works continue being published in 
the most important economic journals as well4, and, finally, the awarding of the 
Nobel Memorial Prize in 2002 to two prominent experimentalists, V. Smith5 and D. 
Kahneman6. This awarding can be considered as the official acknowledgement of 
experimental turn in economics. Hence, the question raised by Plott in the Sixtieth 
Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association in 1990 (Plott, 1991), “will 
economics become an experimental science?”,  may have found a definitive and 
positive answer.          
As a consequence, nowadays it seems rather hard to deny that economics has 
reached the experimental status among sciences (with regard to this, it could be 
significative to note that Samuelson and Nordhaus have removed the sentence 
reported above in the following editions of their book).  
However, some experimental economists oppose the establishment of strict rules in 
experiments (“it is important to avoid establishing rigid orthodoxies on question of 
methodology”, Roth, 1995, p.86), since they attach more importance to the 
possibility to balance costs and benefits in the design of any single experiment, in 
                                               
3 From the ESA statement of purpose and bylaws: “The Purpose of the Association. I. To advance, 
enhance, or further economics as an observational science through use of laboratory and field 
methods of observation and data collection under the control and responsibility of the research 
investigator, and the development of economic theory and statistical or econometric methods based 
on such direct observations and data. The Association seeks to foster replicable, clearly documented, 
empirical work in all subdisciplines of economics, and recognition of the important tasks of data 
creation, data quality evaluation and empirical description, as well as theory development and 
testing”. 
4 See Palfrey and Porter (1991) for some guidelines for the submission of an experimental work in 
Econometrica, as evidence of interest in experimental economics in economic scientific community. 
 
5 “for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially 
in the study of alternative market mechanisms” (from the motivation of the prize). 
  
6 “for having integrated insight from psychological research into economic science, especially 
concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty” (from the motivation of the 
prize). 
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order to plan each experiment in conformity with its specific goals. In my opinion, 
however, in this discipline, as in other experimental disciplines as well, in designing 
an experiment, in deciding what is important and what is not, what to be included 
and what to be not, it is a question of careful appreciation and experience, a sort of 
trade-off between flexibility and orthodoxy, between control and degree of freedom. 
Nevertheless, on a certain number of issues, it seems that a general acceptance and 
agreement has been reached among experimentalists. If we cannot refer to a well-
established methodology yet, formalized in rigid rules, without any doubt we can 
refer to a “common practice” generally received. 
In the following sections, we will try to list some of the uncontroversial issues. 
   
3. Control 
By definition, an experiment is a carefully planned and fully replicable observation 
of a phenomenon under controlled conditions.  
Of preliminary and paramount interest is try to attain as much control as possible in 
the laboratory (“control is the essence of experimental methodology”, Smith, 1976, 
p. 275). As in other experimental disciplines, experiments in economics are carried 
out under the ceteris paribus condition. Generally, a great number of variables 
theoretically and practically affects results in the real world as well as in a particular 
experimental environment, so the first main task of the empirical scientist consists 
in individuating the most important variables for his/her own goals. After this 
preliminary analysis, then it is important to try to keep other variables constant 
(maintained at some constant level along all the experiment), in order to isolate the 
actual effect of the treatment variable(s) (variable(s) set at different levels at 
different points in the same experiment or changed across different treatments) on 
the phenomenon under examination. Depending on the specific aim of an 
experiment, the same variable may be considered treatment variable or constant 
across different experiments or in different tournaments of the same experiment 
(i.e., to test for interaction between treatments). Obviously, in order to detect the 
effect of any treatment variable on the phenomenon, the experimenter will choose 
two or more appropriate ‘values’ for each treatment variable, including the case in 
which the treatment variable will assume a ‘reference value’, treatment usually 
referred as the control group, that it will serve as the benchmark in analysing 
results. Another way to obtain control indirectly is by randomisation. Given that 
usually it is not possible to control for every possible influential factor, the best 
practice consists of assigning participants among treatments using a complete 
random device. At this end, the use of specific recruiting software could prove useful 
(among the most used ones, we can cite ExperimenTrak, ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), 
CasselWeb2, and ExLab), since they permit to recruit and assign subjects to 
experiment in a completely random and anonymous manner.    
Classical example has become the experiment to test for willingness to cooperate in a 
prisoner’s dilemma game (Dresher and Flood at Rand Corporation, 1950). Since 
there is sufficient reason to believe that there may be not negligible differences in 
behaviour among male and female subjects, also known as gender effect (Ortmann 
and Tichy, 1999), in case the experimenter is not particularly interested in it (or in 
case of financial constraints, so that the researcher have not the opportunity to 
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isolate each single treatment variable, but she is forced to focus her attention only 
on a sub-sample of  these), she will look to allocate male and female randomly across 
treatments, such that results will not be vitiated a priori by any not considered 
gender effect7. 
Another important feature in designing an experiment in economics consists of 
choosing between a within design or a between design. In the former, each 
participant will experience more than one treatment variable, in the latter, each 
participant will experience just one treatment. Naturally, both of them have merits 
and flaws. The principal merit in using a within design is the opportunity to 
generate a greater amount of data at a smaller cost, but often these data are harder to 
analyse, even if more reliable and meaningful, since more statistically powerful, 
compared to the same number of observation obtained under between design. 
Moreover, many typical situations being investigated in economics experiment do 
not lend themselves to between design (e.g., in the case of a binary outcome 
variable).   
However, data obtained under a within design experiment often need a further test: 
a test for detecting any order effect that could be occurred when participants have 
been exposed to more than one task in succession.  
3.1. Controlling for subjects’ preferences 
Especially in individual decision making, since most of the theories to be tested are 
based on given assumptions about the subjects’ utilities, it is essential to measure 
subjects’ preferences to test consequent predictions, or, at least, to try for control for 
them. In experimental literature, a series of attempts have been developed at this 
aim. We will try to mention the procedures most widely used by experimenters in 
economics. 
3.1.1.  Vickrey’s auction 
In a very well-known paper, Vickrey (1961) demonstrated that the procedure to 
obtain people truly revealing their valuation for a commodity is the second-price 
sealed-bid auction. 
In this particular type of auction, where bidders submit written bids without 
knowing the bids made by other participants, the commodity is allocated to the 
bidder with the highest bid, but the price to be paid is the second highest bid. 
The principal feature of this kind of auction is its self-revelation or incentive 
compatibility property, whereby each bidder maximizes her expected utility by 
revealing her true valuation. Moreover, it is ex-post efficient, that is, the winning 
bidder is the subject with the highest valuation for the commodity to be auctioned.  
Despite its large use in economic theoretical and empirical literature (virtually, it is 
rather difficult to list all the works that actually implement this auction), the fact 
that it is not particularly common in everyday life, it could require a lot of training 
                                               
7 Recently, a broad literature has been developed about the relationship between demographics and 
economic behaviour. See, for example, Carbone (2005). 
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for the experimental subjects to acquaint themselves with the procedure, slowing 
down the opportunity to achieve its theoretical properties.  
3.1.2.  Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism 
The authors’ primary aim (Becker et al., 1964) to be attained with this paper was the 
development of a sequential method that provides at each step an estimate of the 
utility for a commodity.  
It is important to note that this procedure is based on the expected utility theory 
(EUT), the mainstream theory in individual decision making, but it is independent 
of the specific attitude towards risk. 
The method is such that the subjects are endowed with a risky prospect, and then 
they are required to state their willingness to accept (WTA) to sell this lottery, s. If 
the subject obeys the axioms of the EUT, then it can be shown the dominant 
strategy be the true revealing of her certainty equivalent for the lottery. At this 
point, a mechanism is implemented to establish the selling price: a number b is 
drawn randomly from a uniform distribution. Then, if the case b ≥ s  occurs, the 
subject sells the lottery and gets the price b, if the case b < s occurs, the subject 
retains the lottery and its corresponding prize will be determined. 
In fact, this mechanism has been very widely used in the literature, especially to 
categorize subjects according to their attitude to risk, also thanks to its relative 
simplicity. Nevertheless this mechanism has been proved to have some 
shortcomings. Just to cite one, the empirical finding about the willingness to pay 
(WTP)-WTA disparity or endowment effect (Knetsch, 1989) could cause subjects to 
appear more risk loving than they really are, given that they are required to state 
their WTA. In fact, it has been demonstrated empirically that WTA is generally 
higher than the corresponding WTP in many experiments.   
Moreover, it is important to note that some experimenters are sceptical in the use of 
non-iterative price-naming institutions for the elicitation of value, as BDM 
mechanism actually is. For example, Bohm et al. (1997) have found that, since the 
mechanism is sensitive to the choice of upper bound of the randomly drawn selling 
price, b, it cannot be considered incentive-compatible in general.   
3.1.3. Binary Lottery System 
This method was developed by Roth and Malouf (1979) with the explicit goal of 
controlling for subjects’ utilities, provided that people obey to reduction of 
compound lotteries axiom. 
In their experiments, each subject i bargains over the distribution of lottery tickets. 
Two the possible prizes: a small (σi) and a large (λi) amount of money, and the tickets 
determine the probabilities of winning the large prize, in the sense that if one agent 
gets 30 percent of the available tickets, she also has 30 percent of possibility to win 
the large prize. Given that the utility functions are unique up to a linear 
transformation, we can put u(σi)= 0 and u(λi)= 1. In this manner, it is simply to note 
that each agent’s expected utility is exactly equivalent to the percentage of lottery 
tickets obtained.    
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As authors themselves note, the virtue of this mechanism is the fact that it is quite 
simple to create the “complete information” condition, since knowing her own 
utility corresponds to know exactly other bargainer’s utility. 
Although this procedure has been used in some experimental contexts (auctions, 
game theory) a recent paper by Abbink et al. (1999) has pointed out some 
shortcomings of this method.        
3.2. Controlling for income effect: the Random Lottery Incentive (RLI) system  
Very often, subjects participating in experiments are required to perform more than 
one task, especially in experiments featuring within-subject design. Since they are 
generally paid for each task they complete, this fact could produce the so called 
‘income effect’8, in the sense that at the starting of a subsequent task, the subjects’ 
endowment has changed during the experiment with respect to the beginning, 
contaminating the data. For this reason, and also to economize on research costs, 
allowing experimenters to gather a greater amount of data with the same 
expenditure, it has become rather established among researchers to use the RLI 
system as incentive mechanism. According to this procedure, only the reward 
related to just one task performed during the experiment will be paid at the end. It is 
essential to note that the task to be paid is randomly chosen at the end of the 
experiment (each task has exactly the same probability to be drawn) and that the 
subjects are informed about the procedure before the experiment starts. In this way, 
even if the payoff is gradually changing along with the experiment, nevertheless this 
procedure should ensure subjects keep their endowment unchanged until the end 
(with regard to this, it is assumed that people consider each task in isolation). 
To the best of my knowledge, it is very likely that Becker et al. (1964) were the first 
in using also this procedure. Ever since, the mechanism has been largely employed 
by researchers for its appealing features, until Holt (1986) did not start the debate 
and subjected the procedure to criticism.  
The controversy was brought about by the results about the preference reversals9 
obtained by Grether and Plott (1979). In his paper, Holt affirms that the RLI system 
is only appropriate if the axioms of the EUT are satisfied.   
In a typical preference reversals experiment, people are required to perform three 
tasks, one choice task and two pricing tasks (one for each lottery), and since the RLI 
system is implemented, if subjects treat all the tasks in the experiment as a whole, 
the strategy in the game is equivalent to the choice among two compound lotteries. 
Therefore, he shows that if people fail to obey the independence axiom, the 
                                               
8 In the literature, this effect is also known as ‘wealth effects’.  
 
9 The discovery of this phenomenon was due to two psychologists, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) 
and Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), but it attracted soon economists’ attention because it was against 
the procedure invariance they advocated. In fact, contrary to this, it was discovered that it is possible 
to construct pairs of lotteries such that, when asked to choose among them, most people prefer one of 
the two (the P-bet, a lottery with a high probability of winning a small amount of money), but when 
required to state the price they would selling them at, they put a higher price on the other lottery (on 
the $-bet, a lottery with a low probability of winning a large amount of money).  
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preferences elicited in these compound lotteries may not be the same as elicited in a 
direct choice. Consequently, the use of the RLI system may distort the results 
whenever the independence axiom, or some other axiom, such as the reduction of 
compound lotteries, is not satisfied. For example, an explanation could be found in 
the “isolation effect” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979): it may be that, even if every 
decision is important, subjects would not group all the decision and treat them as an 
interconnected portfolio of decisions (see also Read et al., 1999).   
Starmer and Sugden (1991) ran a first experiment to show that the RLI would have 
no part in the phenomenon of preference reversals, because effective in revealing 
true preferences. In fact, in their experiment, no significant difference was detected 
between real single choices and random lottery designs, although people’s responses 
have been demonstrated to not be always consistent with the reduction axiom. 
Furthermore, in Harrison (1994) the mechanism has been criticized on the basis that 
it may not guarantee that all the costs involved in the decision process are overcome 
by the relative benefits (see Section 5.1 in which the dominance precept is 
introduced), since the expected monetary payoff per task is generally very low. 
Wilcox (1993) actually provides a first evidence that the incentive levels are 
important only when the decisional environment is complex enough, whereas when 
the effort is minimal, there is no reason for subject to economize on that effort not 
only at normal incentive levels, but even when incentives are absent.      
Other experiments have followed up, in which  Beattie and Loomes (1997) and 
Cubitt et al. (1998) test its validity: the former compares single choice and random 
lottery treatments, the latter designed also to detect cross-task contamination effects 
in treatments employing this system. In general, they again found no significant 
differences among the treatments in which subjects faced just a single choice task 
and the treatment in which the RLI system was used10, and therefore Cubitt et al. 
(1998) conclude that there may be no evidence for cross-task contamination effects.     
Finally, a more recent paper by Hey and Lee (2005) is a further evidence that 
subjects actually consider each question in isolation, rather than consider the 
experiment as a whole, also because this would require a “singular degree of 
sophistication on the part of subjects” (p. 235). 
Anyway, these are still preliminary and not general results, since all the experiments 
reported up to now involved the same kind of task: to choose among prospects. With  
regard to this, to reach to more robust results, further empirical investigation may be 
necessary.   
Finally, it should be always considered that every extra amount of instruction and 
incentive mechanism complexity has its cost in terms of subjects’ patience and 
attention.   
 
                                               
10 The only case in which Beattie and Loomes (1997) found a significant difference among the 
treatments is when people had to choose among compound lotteries, instead than among simple 
prospects. 
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4. Subject Pool and Sample Size  
One of the much debated issue in making experiments in social sciences is the 
general use of college students as experimental subjects. The reasons for which the 
researchers usually observe students’ behaviour to test their hypotheses are 
numerous. 
First of all, the reason is matter-of-fact: students are easy to recruit. In fact, usually 
researchers find their experimental subjects by means of notices around university 
campuses, or, more simply, inviting students to volunteer during lectures. More 
recently, making use of the new technologies, some online recruitment systems have 
also been developed (e.g., Greiner, 2004). In this way, it may be also better achieved 
an indirect control by randomisation in recruiting subjects. 
Moreover, students are convenient subject pool since generally quick on 
understanding their task in the experiment. 
Third, and probably more importantly, the particular low opportunity costs make 
students the ideal subjects to make experiments: generally, people participating in an 
experiment are paid in manner to matching, on average, their hourly wage rates, 
besides that according to the decisions they (and other participants) make, and 
consequently it is clear as much convenient is to use students as subject pool 
compared to professionals.  
Another reason is of empirical nature: the very first experiments that compared 
students’ behaviour with other subject pools found virtually no significant 
differences. Interestingly, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973) replicated the preference 
reversals phenomenon with regular players at Las Vegas casino, whereas Burns 
(1985), comparing students’ and businessmen’s behaviour in an auction, found that 
professionals showed even lower learning. Also Dyer et al. (1989) addressed the 
same question comparing students and executives, finding no substantial differences.      
More recently, in reviewing some results in labour market experiments, Falk and 
Fehr (2003) can conclude: “subject pool differences may be a real issue. However, 
the studies also show that the different subject pools do not behave in fundamentally 
different ways. [..] Thus, although there are some quantitative subject pool effects, 
the qualitative pattern of behaviour were rather similar across the different subjects 
pools”.  
Probably, a latest paper that, at least in part, better tries to face the issue, is due to 
Guillén and Veszteg (2006). In this paper, the authors look for demographic effects 
that may be the source of an important subject pool bias if not properly accounted 
for. At this aim, they consider a particularly large data set from different economic 
experiments, where no less than 70 per cent of subjects belongs to student subject 
pool. They find that age and gender may have some effects, whereas experience and 
education do not. Notwithstanding this, demographics seems to explain less than 4% 
of variability observed in monetary payoffs. Consequently, subject pool effects may 
be not so effective in explaining differences in payoffs, and, thus, in subjects’ 
behaviour. Also Carbone (2005) finds no link between strategic behaviour and 
demographics in a life-cycle consumption experimental task.  However, Harrison et 
al. (2005) found different behaviour between (adult) students and the other part of 
the adult population in Denmark.   
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The issue dealing with subject pool bias is particularly important especially in the 
light of external validity, that is, if we want to be confident in transferring 
experimental results to real life. We will come back to the question in Section 7.   
Another related issue is the fact that subjects, independently of the subject pools 
used,  actually volunteer for the experiment (for a very first examination of the 
issue, Kagel et al., 1979. For a more recent investigation, Jones and Seaman, 2003). 
This could create the so called self-selection bias, that, in turn, may distort the 
experimental data. For example, in the public goods game in which we want to test 
for subjects’ willingness to cooperate, the results we obtained could overestimate the 
degree of cooperation itself, since the subjects that have decided to participate may 
have stronger social preferences than the ones do not. Actually, this is even a more 
serious problem, since it involves an ethical dimension. Even though we can rather 
easily test for the robustness of our results obtained from a student subject pool 
comparing them with a different subject pool, nevertheless it is rather difficult, 
instead, to force people to take part in an experiment, because of ethical or political 
constraints.  
4.1. People as the main feature in experiments 
The idea that someone can have formed of experiments in social sciences, and 
actually it is true, is that the difficulties in implementing experiments in this field 
arise just for the fact that experimental economics deals with ‘people’. With regard 
to this, on the mark seems to be Sugden’s definition for experimental economics: 
“theory with people in it” (2000). 
Dealing with real people in the laboratory without doubt has been and is one of the 
most tricky characteristics of experimental economics, and very likely this has had 
its part in slowing down the awareness that it could be really feasible to realize 
experiments in economics at all. 
4.1.1. Experiments versus  simulations  
This peculiarity should be used also to overcome a common misinterpretation, given 
that sometimes experiments are mixed up with simulations, especially by ‘outsiders’. 
Actually, the feature that more can help in distinguishing experiments from 
simulations lies just in the employment of real people in the former, and of 
‘computerized’ agents in the latter (“computer simulations are useful for creating and 
exploring theoretical models, while experiments are useful for observing behaviour”, 
Roth, 1988, p, 1000).  
For simulations, or better, in Agent based Computational Economics (ACE) 
approach (Tesfatsion, 1997, 2001), researchers usually develop software in which 
they programme as the simulated agents are supposed to behave in a given scenario 
according to the particular hypothesis they want to test, and then observe the 
attainment or not of a equilibrium state (Arthur, 2006. In experimental economics, 
for a robustness test of the double auction with zero intelligence traders, Gode and 
Sunder, 1993). More recently, in order to test some learning theories, and also to 
make simulations more realistic, more and more sophisticated software have been 
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developed that allow simulated agents to change their strategies according to 
changes in environment and/or interactions with others (Holland 1995, 1997)11.  
On the contrary, in experiments, researchers put real people, with their own 
background, emotional states, and so on, in a laboratory, where they face real 
decisions, and generally earn real money. More and more often, the focus of 
investigation is not on equilibrium properties, but on behaviour itself, and this has 
very often produced so astonishing results that no programmer could have ever 
conceived of (for a review of results in individual decision making, see Camerer, 
1995).     
4.1.2. Framing and labelling: the ‘psychological interferences’ behind experiments 
It is easy to realize that, since human beings are the object under investigation, the 
variables to be taken into account are theoretically in so large number that it would 
be virtually impracticable to control for each of them (even the colour the 
laboratory is painted may have an effect). This is due to the fact that every single 
change in the experimental environment, even if very little, may cause large 
changes in behaviour.  
Especially for this reason, it has been established to pose the experimental setting to 
subjects as more neutral as possible, in order to prevent that some ‘psychological 
interferences’ spreading in experimental settings. The possible psychological 
processes and the related shrewdness to be undertaken can be countless to list, so in 
this work I would content myself with spending some words about framing12 and 
labelling.   
Experimenters usually prepare their experiments taking care of providing no cue 
about what may be the aim of the work and of conveying no misleading or 
ambiguous or loaded meaning to any aspect of experimental environment and 
institution, but rather of using abstract or context-free terminology, in order to not 
contaminate behaviour or to not lose control (Smith, 1976: “it may be preferable not 
to embellish the instructions with well-intentioned attempts at “realism”; emphasis 
in the original). For instance, it has become classical as example the prisoner 
dilemma experiment: the recommended practice is to not label the two available 
strategies as ‘defect’ or ‘cooperate’, but rather as ‘strategy A’ and ‘strategy B’, or 
‘strategy 1’ and ‘strategy 2’.  
Probably, one of the first to report the phenomenon was Schelling (1957). In his 
experiments, he noticed a higher coordination rate when experimental subjects had 
the opportunity to recognize some “prominent” outcomes among the available ones 
compared with the cases in which no prominent outcomes existed. 
                                               
11 “Agent-based computational economics is the computational study of economies modelled as 
evolving systems of autonomous interactive agents. ACE is thus a specialization to economics of the 
basic complex adaptive systems paradigm” (Holland). 
  
12 In the psychological literature, we observe framing effects when different ways of describing the 
same choice problem change the choices that people make, even though the underlying information 
and choice options remain the same (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). 
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Nevertheless there are also authors that rather strongly oppose the practice of an 
abstract-free experimental set-up. They argue that in this way we misrepresent the 
environment in which people usually take decisions in real life and consequently we 
concur in confounding them, distorting the decisions themselves. If people have no 
idea about the environment in which they are acting, we cannot know if they are 
imposing a their own context on the experiment. If they actually do this, we may 
have completely lost the control. Substantially, this is the opinion supported by 
Harrison and List (2004). They think that field referents can facilitate subjects in 
surmounting confusion about the experimental task, avoiding lack of understanding, 
and in drawing on some specific heuristics from the field to solve the decisional 
problem in the lab. At the same time, they note that not adequate choices of field 
referents could provoke uncontrolled psychological motivations. 
Except for the cases in which framing effects themselves are under investigation, it 
may be preferable that experimenters avoid to provide any cues to experimental 
subjects. Harrison and List argue that “the choice between an abstract script and one 
with filed referents must be guided by the research question”. 
One reason for avoiding framing is simple: not transferring any cues in experimental 
settings preserves the replicability of experiments, even across different 
experimenters. This can be useful also to have experimental data that can be related 
to some ‘conventional’ and clear reference point. To make an example, just consider 
what happens with blood tests. The convention is undergoing them on an empty 
stomach. This is not just because this is by far the best way to make them, but it is 
simply because clinicians set the benchmark blood values according to this reference 
point. At the same time, since economic theories to be tested assume the description 
invariance, we may agree on a particular convenient reference point in order to test 
it. Personally, I see no more general reference point than this. At the same time, I 
agree that it should be convenient a broader testing involving environments framed 
in different ways. We refer to Section 7.4 for a further discussion about the more 
general issue of context effects.                     
4.1.3. Anonymity and the demand-induced effect 
In order to avoid as much as possible some complex social phenomena entering in 
the experimental environment, that even in a laboratory setting could prove to be 
difficult to control for, another measure usually undertaken is ensuring anonymity.    
Generally, anonymity extends to many features of the experiment. For instance, 
except for the cases in which the effects of communication on behaviour are 
explicitly under investigation (with regard to this, there is a rather wide literature 
that it is difficult to completely account for13), generally the participants are strictly 
not allowed to communicate among them (for this reason, very often in the lab each 
participants’ seat is provided with some kinds of partitions), and they do not know 
the subjects they interact with during the experiment. Moreover, if experimental 
                                               
13 For example, in the experimental literature it is now known as stylized fact the finding that the 
communication among participants raise the degree of cooperation in a public goods game (e.g., Isaac 
and Walker, 1991).  
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subjects are monetary rewarded (see Section 5), the common practice consists of 
paying them at the end of the experiment strictly in private.  
In order to reduce social distance, the implementation of computerized treatment 
can prove to be very useful. At this aim, specific software have been developed (an 
experimental software widely used is z-Tree, Fischbacher, 1999). 
It has been investigated also the effect of double anonymity, that is, as the behaviour 
changes when the participants do not interact even with the experimenter (Hoffman 
et al., 1996). With regard to this, the demand-induced effect has been detected. 
According to this, subjects may try to understand researcher’s own goal and then 
endeavour to go in that direction or to behave in the opposite way, depending on 
subject’s attitude towards the experimenter. Clearly, if nothing is done to try to 
prevent this, experimental data may be seriously contaminated.     
Levitt and List (2007), for example, have provided empirical evidence in a social 
preferences experiment indicating that factors like the nature and extent of scrutiny 
by others, the context in which a decision is to be taken, and the ways to select 
participants and tasks are important and that differences between laboratory and 
real experience diverging in one or more of these factors impact on results obtained 
in the lab and their comparison with behaviour observed in naturally occurring 
settings. In other words, the observation is itself a problem in experiments.  
Again, the fact that in all these cases the investigator itself (the experimenter) is part 
of the issue investigated raises very sensitive problems that can be prevent the 
achieving of objective results. Moreover, in some experiments experimenter may be 
considered by participant not only as a neutral observer, but also as an extra player, 
whose presence can alter participants’ behaviour (for an example, the reader can 
refer to Harrison and Johnson, 2005). 
4.2. Sample size and statistical inference   
Related to the issues involving student subject pool, as discussed above, there are 
some statistical problems. Indeed, since very often experimental subjects are only 
students, it may make problematic any kind of inference, since the data could be not 
representative enough. Moreover, usually no more than one/two hundreds subjects 
are involved in an experimental study, but often even less.  
As regards the first point, critics may generally be right when the research question 
directly involves decisions that are clearly different depending, for example, on age. 
Just to cite an example, we can refer to retirement plan choices. Obviously, it is 
rather unquestionable to believe that decisions taken by ‘real people’ that have spent 
more than half of their life at work are different from decisions taken in a laboratory 
by students. Very likely, they have never worked up to that moment, and still do 
not have a clear idea about what job they intend to embark on in their future. 
However, it is still a matter that depends on own work’s goals. On the contrary, if 
we want to tackle an explorative work about time preferences in general, we can 
affirm that,  beyond age and education, factors that undoubtedly are important in 
shaping subjects’ decisions, nevertheless there are further idiosyncratic factors that 
influence subjects’ choices and that may be reliable caught by a student subject pool, 
being representative enough of the entire population.        
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In conclusion, I believe that, whenever the socio-demographics characteristics are 
proven to be no so effective in differentiating behaviour, the problem is not so 
serious as generally considered : “the “problem with students” is the lack of 
variability in their socio-demographic characteristics, not necessarily the 
unrepresentativeness of their behavioural responses conditional on their socio-
demographic characteristics” (Harrison and List, 2004; emphasis in the original). 
As for the second point, generally the experimenters reply that the problem with 
the small numbers is not effectively a real problem, since easily surmountable 
(usually they use small size sample or because of financial constraints or of practical 
implementation). Actually, it is sufficient to replicate the same experimental design 
with fresh subjects to enlarge the sample size14. At this point, it is important to note 
how much imperative is having experimental designs that have incontrovertible 
methodological standards in order to improve replicability. If so, it is possible for 
researchers to have their experimental laboratories even kilometres and kilometres 
far, and still be sure to replicate exactly the same experiment and to have no doubt 
in drawing statistically reliable conclusions15.    
Finally, we can just mention another potential statistical issue. The fact is that 
classical statistical procedures assume that each unit of observation is an 
independent draw. Clearly, this is hardly true in experimental economics. Hence, 
much will depend on the experimental design and on the experience experimenter 
has in handling these problem. As a further solution, usually it may be 
recommendable to implement also non-parametric statistical tests (Conover, 1980; 
Brunner et al., 2002).  
Anyway, concerns about data analysis are broader and would deserve a deeper 
investigation. This would turn to be a fruitful field of research in the future. 
Someone has also already coined a specific new term: “experimetrics” (e.g., Bardsley 
and Moffat, 2005).       
  
5. Incentives 
One of the features that more concurs in distinguish experimental practices among 
economics and psychology and that fuels much debate is surely the use of monetary 
incentives as rewards for participants at the experiments16 (Roth, 1995, p. 86; 
Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001. For the idea that psychologists have regarding this, as 
classical references we can cite Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 264-265, or Thaler, 
                                               
14 However, often experimenters complain of too low opportunities to have published follow-up 
works (Rubinstein, 2001).   
 
15 For example, data collected in different experiments could be aggregated, provided that some 
econometric devices are taken into account, as the inclusion of a dummy variable for each different 
experiment. If replicability has been achieved, these variables should be not significantly different 
from zero. 
 
16 Curiously, the first author advocating the use of monetary incentives was a psychologist, Siegel 
(Siegel and Fouraker, 1960). In this work, they were the first in noting the effects of the presence and 
the size of monetary payoffs on behaviour, meanwhile Smith (1962) reported just one treatment in 
which real monetary payoffs were awarded.  
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1987, p. 120). We should remember that this was also in the Wallis-Friedman 
critique (1942).   
Several and different are the reasons for which experimentalists in economics 
choose to pay participants at their experiments. We will try to present the two most 
relevant ones.  
As recognized by Hertwig and Ortmann (2001), it is likely that the primary rationale 
for financial incentives is that for economists it is quite natural to recreate in the 
laboratory the same framework as in standard economic theory they want to test, 
generally theories built on maximization assumptions. In this sense, given that 
economic agents are seen as maximizing their own utility, or profit, theoretically, 
there is no reason in believing that participants’ actions are not driven by the same 
incentives in the laboratory.  
Another common alleged reason for financial incentives is the belief that rewarding 
participants has an important role in reducing variance in experimental data. The 
rationale behind this is that the financial incentives would induce more effort (or, in 
the cases of particularly time-spending or tedious experiments, they would help in 
counteracting boredom) and would help in maintaining concentration. 
Consequently, they would produce more statistically reliable and more informative 
data.  This belief has been supported with a survey study carried out by Smith and 
Walker (1993), in which they did find that “in virtually all cases rewards reduce the 
variance of the data around the predicted outcome”.  
It is worth citing another source of critique, that is, the fact that generally incentives 
in laboratories are far lower that the ones in the real world. While considering the 
issue important, I do not develop it further here17. 
5.1.  Smith: The induced value theory 
Most of the relevance and the “necessity” of monetary incentives (for example, 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) found that virtually no experimental work without 
payments has been published in a top-rank economic journal between 1970 and 
1997) could be imputable also to the influence Vernon Smith’s argument has had 
among the experimentalists and that he stigmatized in the “induced value theory”. 
In particular, in a couple of very influential papers (1976, 1982), he advanced the 
now so called precepts of experimental economics, that is, in author’s opinion, are 
the sufficient conditions for experimental validity.  
His argument is that the way to obtain control in experimental domain goes through 
inducing prescribed monetary value on actions. In order to achieve this, some 
requirements are to be met in reward medium: a) non-satiation: this is no more than 
a reformulation of the monotonicity assumption, whereby more money is preferred 
to less; b) saliency: according to this precept, the incentives in order to be 
motivationally relevant have to be in a clear and direct relationship with the 
performance achieved in the experiment18 (see also Wilde, 1980); c) dominance: in 
                                               
17 As far as the level of rewards is concerned, I can cite in the experiment by Cameron (1999). Since 
very often the results about the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) were criticized on the ground of 
low stakes, Cameron replicated previous experiments in Indonesia in which the pie to be split was up 
to three times the average monthly expenditure of a participant.   
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order to not lose control, in presence of subjective not monetary costs related to the 
decision process, it is important that the reward structure is sufficiently high in 
order to more than compensate for them (as we have already seen, this is one of the 
reason for which as subject pool students are usually used, for their particularly low 
opportunity costs); d) privacy: in order to rule out any interpersonal comparison that 
could distort the desired induced valuation (with regard to this, see the literature 
developed about fairness (Fehr and Gächter, 2004), it is advisable to keep the 
information about other participants’ payoffs incomplete, in the sense that any 
subject is given only information about his/her outcome. This principle may 
underlie the established practice to pay subjects privately.  
If these requirements are met, we have been able to put in existence an experimental 
microeconomy, that is, a real live economic system, “where real people earn real 
money for making real decision”. Anyway, Smith adds a further precept, the 
parallelism, which we deal with below (Section 7), referring to the external validity 
of the experiments. As we  will see, this is probably the hardest attack to 
experimentation in economics.            
5.2. Harrison: The ‘marginal payoff critique’ 
In a famous and frequently cited paper, Harrison (1989) criticized not the use of 
monetary rewards in themselves, but rather the way in which the payoffs are 
computed from the actions observed during the experiment.  
The critique is that very often, whereas the deviation between the observed action 
and the optimal predicted action seems to be so large such that someone can be 
inclined to reject the theory being tested, nevertheless the difference in the foregone 
expected payoffs is rather insignificant. According to this, especially when there are 
not negligible decision costs, the subjects could not make much effort to reach the 
optimal choice, given that the gain in expected payoff is not so much as to offset the 
extra effort. Consequently, on the margin, there should not be so much difference in 
choosing  actions that deviate from the optimum, even if these actions lead to 
completely different theoretical conclusions: the cost of misbehaviour (measured in 
foregone expected payoff) appears to be no so serious. On the contrary, from a 
scientific point of view, the cost associated to the rejection of a theory could be 
rather large. Harrison concludes arguing that in these kinds of experiment the 
precept of dominance would be often not satisfied. 
As expected, this paper raised debates and comments, collected altogether in an issue 
in American Economic Review (vol. 82, number 5; 1992).  
In their comment, Friedman (1992) and Kagel and Roth (1992) agree in thinking 
that Harrison overstated his case, rejecting his assertion whereby it would be more 
natural to test hypothesis in payoff space rather than in action space, but at the same 
                                                                                                                                          
18 However, very often, besides the payoff earned during the experiment, a flat show-up fee is 
scheduled. Various the reasons for this. For example, since the risk of giving up is always present, 
often a number of participants larger than necessary is recruited. So, supernumerary people that will 
have no opportunities of participating will be compensated in any case. Sometimes, when 
experimental subjects can incur in some losses (but generally campus regulations do not allow 
students pay out of their own pocket), the show-up fee is scheduled just to cover the losses. 
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time appreciate his attempt to reconsider the cost of deviations as a useful robustness 
check, as well, more generally, his effort to bring to attention these kinds of issues.  
Instead, Cox et al. (1992; we should note that a series of their studies were the 
original attack in Harrison, 1989) defend their own work, asserting that they have 
always been interested in motivational questions and showing that the measure 
suggested by Harrison is not an informative aid in their auction experiments19.   
On the other hand, in their contribution, Merlo and Schotter (1992) emphasize that 
the strength of Harrison’s critique is, in fact, rather restricted. They show how his 
criticism holds only for a particular subset of experiments (in which the task is 
neither too easy, nor too difficult, and in the cases in which subjects have good 
opportunities to learn) and depends also on the particular participants’ attitude 
towards the experiment itself. Moreover, using experimental data, they demonstrate 
that the shape of theoretical payoff function (steep, as Harrison suggests it should be, 
or flat) in fact seems to have a little impact on a large fraction of subjects (only 35% 
of subjects consistent with Harrison’s critique).  
Finally, in  Harrison (1992), the author restates the critique in wider terms. He 
cleverly presents as an example the BDM mechanism (for further details, see Section 
3.1.2). He supposes a subject reports as a selling price a value of 5 cents less than her 
true value, showing as this false report results in a foregone expected payoff of 0.015 
cents only. However, as it is simply to note, a rational player that prefers more to 
less (and Harrison himself reminds the nonsatiation as precept) should still prefer 
the true telling to false reporting, until decision costs are completely negligible, as it 
is likely in so straightforward tasks.  
In the rest of the paper, Harrison strikes back each of the previous comments. From 
his reply a series of interesting methodological reflections can be derived.  
This has been a clear example of how the dialogue among experimentalists is a so 
important and necessary path to be undertaken for the developing of experimental 
research programme, so that these kinds of symposia cannot be more than 
appreciated.      
5.3. To pay or not to pay?  
We can surely affirm that, if there are valid theoretical reasons to motivate 
experimental subjects with monetary rewards, to what extent they really matter 
remains essentially an empirical issue. 
Probably, the first work that tried to make the point was Smith and Walker (1993). 
As we will already noted, their survey (31 experiments) substantially leads to the 
finding that increased payoffs have a two-fold effect: in increasing the consistence of 
experimental data with rationality, and in reducing the variance in the data. They 
conclude asserting that whenever the data fail to reach the rational models 
prediction, this may be attributed to the low opportunity costs of deviating from 
theoretical predictions. 
                                               
19 In fact, the methodological digression in Cox et al. (1992) is more wide-ranging and involves 
accurate details about the design and the analysis of auction experiments. Even if this is an interesting 
issue, nevertheless this is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.   
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More structured the conclusion Camerer and Hogarth (1999) reached in their wider 
survey (74 experiments). They also observe that higher payoffs lead to reducing 
variance, but additionally they show that the effects of higher incentives are rather 
complex. Actually, the fact that monetary rewards are at stake and their actual 
amount seem to affect mean results for some kinds of tasks (in particular, in 
judgement and decision tasks) in which at higher payoffs correspond a better 
performance, but for the most part rewards are showed to have almost no effect on 
other kinds of tasks, for a series of reasons. Moreover, there are cases in which 
monetary rewards seem even to hurt, for example when higher payoffs lead to 
exacerbating the use of a heuristic and consequently to observing more instances for 
a bias. Another finding is that higher payoffs may reduce self-presentation effects. 
This term usually is used to intend that behaviour chosen in order to make a good 
impression from a social desiderability perspective, and it can be seen as a sub-case 
of demand-induced effect. As an example, we can cite the dictator game (Forsythe et 
al., 1994). In this game some subjects, while recognizing as rational the strategy to 
give nothing to the other player, nevertheless they would choose to give her a share 
of their own endowment in order to present themselves as generous.  
Of some relevance also the survey carried by Hertwig and Ortmann (2001), that 
reaches substantially the same results.   
More recently, there have been two studies that have used experimental methods to 
investigate the methods experimenters themselves use, what I have defined meta-
experiments. In Holt and Laury (2002), in a simple lottery-choice experiment, is 
found that financial incentives practically matter, since higher the magnitude in real 
payoffs, higher the degree of risk aversion, but the same thing does not occur under 
hypothetical payoff treatment.  Conversely, Tenorio and Cason (2002), considering 
the Wheel Game performed in a TV programme and its replication in the 
laboratory, found that the deviations from the theoretical predictions are largely 
independent of the stake levels of the game. 
Finally, Read (2005) asserts that monetary incentives do not assure the achievement 
of the three effects that are usually ascribed to: cognitive exertion (Wilcox, 1993; 
Harrison, 1994), motivational focus, and emotional triggers, and even that there may 
be no basis at all for requiring the use of monetary incentives, but that these effects 
can be achieved in other ways. For instance, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) advance 
experience as substitute for financial incentives.    
So far, we can affirm that there is a nearly general agreement on the fact that using 
financial incentive produces more reliable data given the reduction in variance 
empirically observed. Notwithstanding this, there is no agreement on the fact that 
the attainment of less variable data is in any case sufficient to require anyway the 
use of financial incentives to motivate subjects. It should be noted, however, that at 
this point a new methodological issue would arise: sometimes, if no financial 
incentives are scheduled, it could be not easy to distinguish survey data from proper 
experimental data, if we use monetary rewards as divide between them (Friedman, 
1988).    
In conclusion, being fundamentally an empirical issue, it is clear that further works, 
in the same spirit of Holt and Laury’s (2002), are more than useful to try to settle the 
issue and in order to adopt a common standard in future experiments. For instance, 
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it is now rather established that financial incentives matter particularly  for decision 
tasks, but not in other kinds of tasks. Probably, in the future we will have a common 
protocol in which rewards are necessarily required for these tasks, but only optional 
for other ones. Eventual possibility if and only if further empirical evidence will be 
collected.     
     
6. Training and Learning 
6.1. Instructions 
Once subjects have entered and taken their seat in the laboratory, the first thing 
generally done is instructing them about the task they will be asked to perform 
during the experiment20.  
With regard to this, experimenters have developed rather widespread rules across 
experimenters and experimental laboratory centres. 
Firstly, instructions are required to be kept as much simple as possible and to be 
framed in neutral words (see Section 4.1.2). For this reason, it is a useful practice to 
circulate them among colleagues before the experiment in order to collect comments 
and suggestions to improve and simplify them. Indeed, researchers designing the 
experiment may fall into the so called knowledge’s curse (Camerer et al., 1989). In 
this particular context, it means that often, who is very involved in a research 
project, can take for granted each single detail that, although insignificant at all 
appearance, could be very significant from participants’ perspective. Some 
researchers told they sometimes experienced problems in explaining how 
probabilities actually work even to students with statistical background.   
Secondly, instructions are usually intended to give subjects only the relevant 
information to perform the experimental task. It is common practice to avoid to 
provide them experiment’s goal in order to not produce undesiderable induced-
demand effects (see Section 4.1.3): “The instructions make clear the opportunities 
available to the subjects, but the motivation is supplied by the people” (Plott, 1982, 
p.1490). Moreover, this practice proves to be essential in order to not contaminate 
behaviour with extrinsic motivation, so that the only (or, at least, the most 
prominent) motivation for participants remains the monetary reward. In this 
perspective, this way of conceiving the instructions is another manner to attain 
control in the laboratory.  
Thirdly, usually experimenters read the instructions aloud: in this way it is assured, 
at least theoretically (we cannot avoid that some subjects do not pay attention at all 
even during instructions reading), that every participant is given the same amount of 
information before the experiment starts, establishing a scenario of common 
knowledge21 among them. Indeed, if experimental subjects are told to read the 
                                               
20 In experimental economics is also quite common the fact that authors add instructions to their 
paper or make them promptly available on request. This practice also concurs in reducing ambiguity 
and in enhancing replicability. 
 
21 I realize the term common knowledge is used in a very specific way in game theory (Gibbons, 
1992). In this context, I have used this expression just to mean that each subject, at the least, receives 
publicly exactly the same amount of information, that could be considered as a part of her personal 
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instructions on their own, we cannot say with certainty if participants actually read 
them. Indeed, if a no negligible fraction actually do not read the instructions, we 
may obtain misleading data. That instructions are read aloud do not exclude that 
subjects are always provided with some scripts: in this manner, they have always the 
opportunity to read again instructions if not clear enough in some parts or at the 
moment in which are actually relevant during the experiment. This practice also 
distinguishes experimental designs in economics and psychology (Hertwig and 
Ortmann, 2001).  
Clearly, sometimes the experimental design forces experimenters to not read aloud 
the instructions. For instance, this can happen in experimental games, where there 
are two kinds of players with completely different roles and strategies to be played, 
or in the cases in which subjects are provided with different private information. 
Consider the case of oral double auction: as explained in Smith (1962) and Plott 
(1982), the payoff functions are induced by individual redemption values and cost 
schedules, for buyers and sellers, respectively, and the key-variable design is that 
everyone knows nothing about others’ schedules. 
The standard practice should be the public reading of written instructions, unless 
opposite reasonable motivations are at stake.   
6.1.1. Understanding the instructions: training 
Usually, experimenters do not settle for reading instructions aloud and providing 
subjects with scripts. After reading, they also give subjects the opportunity to ask as 
many questions as they want and are often encouraged to do this. The choice of 
answering privately or publicly depends on the nature of the questions itself. 
Actually, this may be the optimal opportunity to overcome some deficiencies in 
instructions not detected up to that moment. 
Moreover, generally a more direct test to control if subjects have entirely 
understood the instructions is conducted. Several the methods used at this aim, and 
generally one rules out another one. Up to now, no structural methodological debate 
has come out about this, but there is some disagreement among different 
experimental centres. 
One method consists of running a written test, known as control questions in the 
experimental literature, just after the reading of instructions. Generally, participants 
are required to fill in a paper or an electronic form with some questions about the 
available strategies for playing the game or about some examples regarding how to 
compute the payoff. The answers are checked before the experiment starts so that 
the experimenter has the opportunity to clarify further the design. The main 
shortcoming of this method is that it could create an anchoring effect, i.e., the 
subjects may consider the examples in the questionnaire having a particular meaning 
so that they could be tempted to use them as reference points for the entire 
experiment, or, as regards the strategies presented as illustration, decide to play 
according to them or against them.   
                                                                                                                                          
“endowment” in order to be enabled to run the experiment. I am not the only one to use this term 
with this meaning. For some instances, Smith (1994, p.120), and Friedman and Sunder (1994, p. 212).   
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Another method often used consists of running some trial periods. In this case, 
subjects play exactly the same game that they will play in the proper experiment for 
some periods, with the only difference that in these very first periods they will 
receive no rewards for the decisions taken and they are informed about this in 
advance. This is the reason that leads Friedman and Sunder (1994) to name these as 
“dry-run periods”. Also this method has advantages and disadvantages. The principal 
advantage is that subjects have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the 
game (as can be noted, this is not possible with the control questions method). This 
could be especially important for computerized treatments, in which some may 
present problems in interfacing with computers. On the other hand, the usual 
criticism against this method is that, given the data referring to the trial periods are 
not considered in further analysis, and given the most part of learning usually takes 
place just in these very first periods, as a result we would have experimental results 
show more consistency and rationality than if not.  
Finally, also for obviating these deficiencies, while maintaining the advantages at 
the same time, a different method that we could term “dummy practice treatment” 
has been developed. This is substantially equivalent to running trial periods, only 
that the parameter values in these periods are distinct enough from the values used 
in the proper experiment, in order to avoid any possibility for anchoring effects and 
to develop some training about the task in general. 
As above underlined, up to now no work has been done to detect if these pre-
experiment training methods have any systematic and/or different effects on 
following experimental results. This will be another question in which the use of 
meta-experiments may prove to be very useful. 
6.2.  Stationary replications and experience 
As it will be already clear reading the preceding section, usually subjects performing 
an experiment in economics are required to complete the same task more than one 
time, for several “periods”, with no changes occurred in the meantime. In some 
parts, this feature is referred as the “Groundhog Day22 replication” (Camerer, 1997). 
For opposite appraisals of this procedure, see Loewenstein (1999), that substantially 
criticizes it, and Binmore (1999), who, instead, is in support of it.   
The rationale to do this is that during the first task performance people could be 
confused, in case of computerized treatments, they could not have properly 
understood the roles or how the experimental software properly works, such that 
data referring to very first periods may be misleading, until enough experience has 
not been acquired. Indeed, beyond the mere repetition, usually subjects are provided 
with performance  feedback of their previous decisions. 
The reason for repeated trials is also that people have usually several opportunities 
for learning in the real world, and these opportunities are recreated, to some extent, 
in laboratories, with replications of the task.  
                                               
22 “Groundhog Day” is an American movie directed by Harold Hamis (1993), in which the main 
character finds himself living the same day over and over again.    
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Anyway, and maybe more importantly, it is the general interest of economists in 
reaching equilibrium situations that suggests repeated trials. 
As an empirical investigation whether replications of the task actually improve the 
consistency of the decisions taken, we can refer to Hey (2001). In this study, the 
author is primarily interested in investigating the nature of noise that is generally 
observed in the experimental data. His results are supportive of individual 
heterogeneity: indeed, there are subjects whose number of inconsistencies decline 
over the five repetitions of the same task, for which we can affirm that actually the 
noise is temporary, and there are subjects whose inconsistency rate remains 
substantially constant during the experiment, so that repetition does not seem to 
improve consistency.  
Furthermore, given the repetitions, researchers have also the opportunity to observe 
how fast learning processes in human beings occur for tasks at different complexity 
levels. With regard to this, we should mention that a wide literature is spreading 
about learning theories (Roth and Erev, 1995; Camerer and Ho, 1998; Erev and 
Roth, 1998, just to cite a few) and that the observation of the behaviour in 
experimental laboratories is undoubtedly a favourable place where these tests can be 
conducted in a controlled environment.   
Another debated issue and a common source of criticism is the role and the 
employment of experienced or unexperienced people in experiments, issue that to 
some extent is intertwined with subject pool bias (Section 4). However, further and 
specific methodological questions may arise. For example, it could be necessary to 
control directly for experience, introducing or a dummy variable (0 = no experience; 
1 = experience) or a discrete or continuous variable (e.g., number of participations in 
previous experiments or number of hours spent in previous experiments, 
respectively) in econometric analyses. As an alternative solution, we may 
considering the employment of experienced vs. unexperienced subjects as treatment 
variables on its own (Friedman, 1988).  
To date, however, it seems that no general agreement has been reached, but these 
decisions are generally left at researchers’ discretion.   
Before leaving this issue and turning to a probably much debated one, I will give just 
a short account of a theory that aroused interest in recent years: the Discovered 
Preference Hypothesis (DPH) developed by Plott (1996), and that, to some extent, is 
related to experience with a task. DPH theory is based on observation and tries to 
explain how “with practice and experiences, under conditions of substantial 
incentives, and with the accumulating information that it is obtained from the 
process of choice, the attitudes stabilize in the sense of a consistent decision rule, 
reflecting the preferences that were discovered through the process” (p. 228). 
According to this theory, preferences are stable and ‘innate’, but they need to be 
discovered. With regard to this, it is clearly contrasting with the Constructed 
Preference Hypothesis (CPH), developed among others by Slovic (1995), whereby 
people construct different preferences relative to different environments they face 
each time. These two theories have offered new directions of how interpreting 
experimental data, and will not fail to suggest new lines of reserch in the future, as 
they have already done (for an example, see Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999).     
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6.3.  Deception 
In experimental economics community, deception is almost generally considered a 
taboo (Hey, 1991; Ledyard, 1995, p. 134: in his passage, honesty in conducting 
experiments is famously likened to a public good). Probably, the clearest explanation 
of the rationale behind this stance can be found in Davis and Holt (1993, p. 23-24) 
and this point of view is shared nearly by the majority of economics 
experimentalists:  
 
“the researcher should be careful to avoid deceiving participants. Most economists are very 
concerned about developing and maintaining a reputation among the student population for 
honesty in order to ensure that subject actions are motivated by the induced monetary rewards 
rather than by psychological reactions to suspected manipulation. Subjects may suspect 
deception if it  is present. Moreover, even if subjects fail to detect deception within a session, it 
may jeopardize future experiments if the subjects ever find out that they were deceived and 
report this information to their friends” (emphasis added). 
 
The main concern about the deception is clearly the potential loss of control in 
which the experimenter could incur if only participants have even the least doubt 
about whatever procedure employed by experimenter.   
The key word all the debate spins around is the relevance of building and 
maintaining up a reputation, since economics experimenters fear negative spillover 
effects to spread if only some of them implement deceptive practises.  
Another illuminating illustration against the deception can be found in Hey (1998). 
Particularly, in this paper, it is also clarified the difference “between not telling 
subjects things and telling them the wrong things. The latter is deception, the 
former is not” (italics in the original, p. 397). This is an important methodological 
point that should be always kept in mind. Actually, subjects hardly ever are told the 
experiment’s goal, but this is never conceived as  a deceptive device.    
Probably, the only one that strikes a discordant note is Bonetti (1998a, 1998b). In his 
papers, he states that there are no supportive evidence against the use of deception 
and, quite the opposite, in some circumstances the deception could lead to potential 
benefits. 
To some extent, an intermediate position between these two extremes is expressed 
in McDaniel and Starmer (1998). They consider the use of deception as potential 
treatment variable in some very limited cases, but are very cautious in promoting a 
general use of deceptive practises. 
Ortmann and Hertwig (2001), after reviewing relevant research in psychology, 
conclude that “prohibition of deception is a sensible convention that economists 
should not abandon”, since also in psychology experiments deception is proven to 
affect subjects’ behaviour.  
My personal judgement is that there are no reasonable grounds on which one can 
sustain the use of deception, even if there would be no empirical evidence, as 
Bonetti asserts, that proves as harmful the deception could be. It makes no sense to 
tell subjects something and then implement another one. From a methodological 
point of view, whether a researcher acts in this way, then, how will she interpret 
the experimental data she obtains? Referring to what the subjects are told at the 
beginning of the experiment, or referring to what they could have thought or 
 25 
discovered during the experiment? Indeed, as an experimenter, it is essential to have 
an idea how participants will interpret the game, otherwise she could lose control 
completely. In addition, to what extent can the experimenter learn something about 
the opinion that the subjects could have formed during the course of  a deceptive 
experiment? At the end, running very badly designed experiments, what is she 
testing?  
Someone supports some deceptive practises, asserting that in this way would be 
possible to implement experimental design otherwise hardly feasible. The example 
commonly cited is the experiment where in a public goods game subjects were told 
to play with 100 subjects, but actually there were only five (Kim and Walker, 1984). 
These problems can be overcome also thanks to particularly talented experimenters 
and their inventiveness, and also thanks to new technologies. For example, 
nowadays the same 100-people public goods game could be replicated in several 
laboratories connected in real time by Internet. 
       
7. The “triangular relationship”: Experiments, theory and world  
In this section I will try to sketch some relevant issues and then to reach to a 
(provisional) conclusion. At this aim, some papers published in a symposium in a 
recent issue of Journal of Economic Methodology (issue 12, number 2; 2005) may be 
useful and may shed some light on the matter. 
As regards the related question associated with the peculiarity of human beings 
being the object of investigation, see the Section 4.1 above. However, here I can add 
just a couple of remarks. First, in some parts the attack against economics 
experiments is grounded on the basis that human behaviour is unpredictable or the 
relating explanations too complex to investigate. However, since it should be clear 
that this argument is not only against experimentation in particular, but more 
generally against the predictive role of economic theories, I will not go into it 
further. Second, and probably a most serious issue, there may be the doubt that since 
human beings are conscious of participating in an experiment, this fact could be 
sufficient in its own to affect their behaviour (in literature, it is known as 
“Hawthorne effect”; Landsberger, 1958). It is not difficult to note that this effect is a 
much wider than the “demand-induced effect”. However, this is a problem related 
to experimentation in every social science, and, furthermore, follow-up research has 
shown almost no evidence for this effect (e.g., Jones, 1992).         
7.1.  The “artificiality critique” 
As we already noted (Section 2), the first critique, in chronological order, against 
experiments in economics was the one advanced by Wallis and Friedman (1942), 
referring to the alleged artificiality of experimental situation.  
At present, more than sixty years after, this attack to experimental economics is still 
relevant. Indeed, if there is a roughly wide consensus among economics 
experimentalists about the practices to be implemented, so that the internal validity 
is generally preserved, more critical the situation regarding the external (or 
ecological) validity. That is, provided that experimenter follows the “common 
practices” broadly shared by profession, namely, the ones that consider primarily 
important the employment of adequately motivated subjects, put in a controlled 
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environment, where they are not deceived, but rather are given the opportunity to 
understand properly the task they are required to perform and given the 
opportunity to acquaint themselves with it, generally the experiment so designed is 
considered internally valid, in the sense that the causal relations derived from it can 
be considered as fundamentally true and replicable. More problematic, instead, to 
assess to what extent we can “export” the laboratory results to the real world. This is 
a not marginal methodological issue. Indeed, if results achieved in the laboratory are 
found to be “artificial”, not being representative of people’s behaviour in the real 
world, then these results would be of limited interest, or even meaningless. Even the 
best practices implemented in the laboratory would lose any significance. With 
regard to this, Loewenstein (1999, F33) considers the lack of external validity “the 
Achilles heel of all laboratory experimentation”.  
Schram (2005) provides a deep evaluation of the artificiality critique, reviewing all 
the relevant literature and pointing out the tension, or, even, the trade-off between 
external and internal validity. Also, he strongly relates the question of external 
validity with the specific goal an experiment is aimed to. In particular, when 
experimental research is aimed at discovering behavioural regularities (“searching 
for facts” category in Roth’s taxonomy (1995)), the urgency for external validity is 
more pressing. Given an increasing number of theories has been developed on the 
basis of experimental results, the author warns experimenters and theorists of the 
possible complete lack of  connection with outside-the-lab world that this procedure 
could cause.  
Bardsley (2005), on the other hand, is more drastic, asserting that in some instances 
the situations explored in the lab are completely different from those supposed to be 
investigated, since some ‘relational’ phenomena occur only in the real world. 
According to the ‘artificiality-of-alteration critique’, only some individual decision 
problems and games would be possible to study in the laboratory, and he also asserts 
how the experimental reports should conform to this assertion.       
Hogarth (2005) lingers over the representativeness of experimental designs. Given 
that these are framed in abstract environments, the results so obtained would be 
generalized only to abstract environments, and not to the real outside-of-the-lab 
world. He also identifies the way of making the experiment representative: 
considering any experiment as a sample, two the suggested dimensions to take into 
account: participants (but see Section 4, and Cooper et al., 1999), and, probably as 
the most demanding requirement, situations.   
7.2.  Are experiments the suitable setting where to test theories? 
Being one of the primary purposes in running experiments the theory testing 
(“speaking to theorists” category in Roth’s taxonomy (1995)), it is clear that also this 
question becomes of preliminary importance: to assess to what extent the 
experimental test of theories are appropriate. The problem is clearly stated, for 
example, in Starmer (1999a).  
Sugden (2005a) recognizes the “triangular relationship” between experiment, theory 
and world, showing that experimenters have often used in their own defence against 
the artificiality critique the fact that their experiments resemble as much as possible 
the theory to be tested (e.g., Plott, 1982, 1991), so that the alleged “unrealism” is to 
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be sought ultimately in the theory,  returning the critique to sender. In turn, this 
response has raised further points, issues developed by Guala (2005a), Cubitt (2005) 
and Hausman (2005), respectively. In particular, Guala (2005a) lingers over the 
problem of completeness, that is, the importance of an exact specification of the 
domain for economic theories, while Cubitt (2005) points out the distinction 
between the fundamental domain of an economic theory, and the domains of its 
applications and of its empirical testing, and the legitimacy to test economic theories 
in the lab. Finally, Hausman (2005) is concerned with the specific problem whether 
game theory could be actually tested in the laboratory, concluding that the 
experimenter test only “some particular empirical interpretation of game theory” (p. 
212). 
A closely connected problem is the fact that theoretical assessment may heavily 
affect the decisions regarding the empirical researches to be undertaken and the way 
of interpreting the experimental data (Starmer, 2005. On this point, the reader can 
also refer to Roth, 1988). Further interesting remarks can be found in Sugden 
(2005b), about the different roles of experiments in behavioural economics, and the 
interconnection about some specific behavioural phenomena found in experimental 
setting and theory; in Mäki (2005), that deals with the close similarities between 
models and experiments, and even their interchangeable role in some cases, being 
the difference only in the means of control; and in Morgan (2005), who argues that 
both theory and experiments have the same mediator role, but experiments may 
have a greater epistemic power, both since experiments share the same ontology 
with the real economic world, and since they give the opportunity to discover new 
phenomena, provided that participants have a certain degree of freedom during the 
experiment.      
7.3. The Duhem-Quine thesis 
In passing, I think is worth citing this common problem to any experimental science 
(Duhem, 1953; Quine, 1953), no less, therefore, to experimental economics, and so 
often cited in the literature (Smith, 1994). According to this, a theoretical claim can 
be empirically tested not in isolation, but only if conjoined with some ‘ancillary’ 
assumptions: “economic theories do not come fully specified with all the conditions 
necessary for conducting a test. Theories must be interpreted before they can tested 
[..] one is testing not simply the validity of some model, but the model combined 
with various assumptions” (Starmer, 1999a). Often, Smith’s precepts are considered 
as auxiliary  hypotheses in experimental economics. According to Duhem-Quine 
thesis, results of every empirical test are always susceptible of more than one 
interpretation: for example, in the case a theory fails, there is the doubt that this 
may be due to the fact that auxiliary hypothesis have not held, and not the proper 
theory being tested.   
  
7.4. The parallelism precept as principle of induction 
As we have seen, some of the most prominent economists have tried to settle the 
artificiality critique elegantly, remarking the connection between the theory and the 
laboratory, rather than between the laboratory and the real world:  
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“the more that accepted theory can be invoked, the less the experimental process needs to 
“mirror” the natural analog” (Plott, 1982, p. 1521). 
 
“The experiments should be judged by the lessons it teaches about theory and not by its 
similarity with what nature might happen to have created” (Plott, 1991, p. 906).   
 
 “what is most important about any particular experiment is that it be relevant to its purpose. 
If its purpose is to test a theory, then it is legitimate to ask whether the elements of alleged 
‘unrealism’ in the experiment are parameters in the theory. If they are not parameters in the 
theory, then the criticism of ‘unrealism’ applies equally to the theory and the experiment” 
(Smith, 1982, p.937).  
     
In order to reply to artificiality critique, the fifth precept advocated by Smith (1982), 
parallelism, may come to experiments’ rescue. Smith asserts that: 
 
“since economic theory has been inspired by field environments, we would like to know [..] if 
such (experimental) results are transferable to field environments. 
A sufficient condition or this transferability of results can be summarized as a final precept [..]. 
Parallelism: Proposition about the behaviour of individuals and the performance that have 
been tested in laboratory microeconomies apply also to nonlaboratory microeconomies where 
similar ceteris paribus conditions hold” (emphasis in the original, p. 936).   
   
However, granting this position, particular attention should be paid to determine 
exactly what are the ceteris paribus conditions for each single situation, and this 
determination is far from being simple in most of cases.  
Roughly the same position is shared by Wilde (1980), Loomes (1999a) and Starmer 
(1999b), whereas in Starmer (1999a), he also argues that most of artificiality 
criticism is based on implementation of specific procedures, but no arguments would 
be against the experimentation on humans in more general philosophical terms.  
It should be noted that this precept is especially helpful when experiments are 
aimed at being test-bed for economic theories, as cited authors themselves admit. 
Meanwhile, in all the cases in which experiments are aimed at different goals, the 
parallelism precept may not be sufficient or even not applicable, and so more 
attention to the concern about the external validity should be paid.  
Some recent works may prove to be enlightening. For example, Dohmen et al. 
(2005) test behavioural relevance of a survey by means of a field experiment. In like 
manner, we should conduct some kinds of representative survey to validate 
experimental results. Benz and Meier (2006), on the other hand, test if lab 
experiment results are correlated with field experiment results.  
As an alternative solution, there should be the requirement of a systemic 
investigation of the ‘context effects’, that is, the study of the effects of different 
descriptions of the same experimental situation to participants, one description made 
in ‘abstract’ terms, and the other made in ‘realistic’ terms. In an experimental market 
setting, for example, in one treatment subjects could be told that they are buyers or 
sellers, that they are required to trade mugs, pencil, or whatever else, and so on 
(‘realistic’ treatment), whereas in the other treatment they could be told that during 
the experiment they act or in the role A or in the role B, that they have to trade 
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simply a good, and so on (‘abstract’ treatment)23 (substantially the same idea is 
shared by Harrison and List, 2004).   
As regards the last two issues, a work by Bernasconi et al. (2006) is particularly 
relevant in these two main respects. On the one hand, concerning comparison of 
real with lab data, it should be noted that, in a forecast task, their experimental 
subjects are exposed to real stimuli, rather than artificially constructed time series. 
On the other hand, concerning the test of context effects, they implement a control 
treatment where subjects are not informed about the actual origin of the times series 
given as stimulus.          
Finally, it is clear that the “artificiality critique” remains one of the most important 
open issue in experimental economics, and probably in a very recent future an ever 
increasing amount of work will be lavished on it, even though a laboratory 
experiment should be judged by its impact on understanding, rather than by its 
fidelity either to reality or to formal model. At the same time, however, it should be 
clear that this criticism equally applies to some theories. Even though some 
experiments, to some extent, can appear unrealistic (because they provide no cue at 
all to participants, contrary to what they usually experience in the real world, so 
that they could feel confused) nevertheless it is surely no more realistic, for example, 
a theoretical model entirely grounded on the representative agent approach (e.g., 
Kirman, 1992).  Since “the abstractions of the laboratories are orders of magnitude 
smaller than those of economic theory” (Smith, 1982, p.936), the “artificiality 
critique” should lead to question also some methodological issues on the theoretical 
side of the matter.                    
 
8. Conclusions 
Being the experimental economics a “subdiscipline [..] still relatively young” 
(Loomes, 1999b), it is understandable that experimenters have delayed a little 
developing wide methodological discussions (Schram, 2005, p. 225). However, at the 
same time, it is undeniable to affirm that some incontrovertible firm points have 
been reached among the profession, first, maybe tacitly and implicitly, but 
afterwards, an ever increasing shared “common practice” whose I have tried to 
account for in this work. 
Probably, someone will brand the methodology I have tried to illustrate to be the 
“lower-case-m methodology” (McCloskey, 1985, p. 25, as cited by Hands, 2001), as 
opposed to the proper Methodology, the one dealing with the philosophical issue of 
scientific knowledge (at the moment, in the field of experimental economics, maybe 
one of  the first attempts in this direction is Guala, 2005b). Nevertheless I have 
judged noteworthy to provide a survey of the methodological works appeared, 
among other things, in mainstream economics journals, along with my modest 
reasoned comments, for two main reasons.  
                                               
23 In addition, often in financially motivated experiments, in the course of the experiment itself the 
payoff is not computed in national currency, but rather in “tokens” and then cashed at a known 
exchange rate at the end of the experiment. Therefore, also the use of national currency instead of 
some more abstract kind of currency should be tested to be relevant.    
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First, the level of the methodological debate is far from being held cheap. Indeed, 
maybe because trying to counter against the numerous attacks, experimental 
economists have promptly begun to affirm the scientific dignity of their research 
programme with a high intellectual effort devoted to it. 
Second, notwithstanding this praiseworthy effort, at the current state of the 
literature, a systematic survey of methodological contributions was still missing, and 
this has been the stimulus behind this work, with which I hope to have filled the 
gap, partly at least.   
At this point, I need hardly summarize the main points discussed above. However, I 
find a couple of remarks noteworthy to express.  
First, a clear pattern can be derived from the methodologies put in practice. As a 
desiderable property, we should try to design experiments having in mind as much 
as possible the experimental aim and the research question. With regard to this, the 
researcher’s sensitivity, able to weight in a wise way all the ingredients, is of 
paramount importance. In order to obtain this goal, experimenter should always 
takes in consideration a series of tradeoffs are at stake: between realism and control, 
between control and external validity, between what is considered theoretically 
ideal and what is actually feasible.      
Second, but on this experimenters have already gone rather a long way, we should 
preserve as much as possible reliability and replicability, and at this aim common 
practice more widely shared are essential. At this point, the habit to make available 
rough data and all the material used in the experiment is more than commendable24. 
Third, the fact that the situation is, on the whole, not so bad, should not let us rest 
on laurels. In fact, important open issues remain, especially regarding the external 
validity of experiments. At this aim, I find rather doubtless that a more frequent use 
of what I have defined metaexperiments will prove to be very fruitful in the future.   
In conclusion, experimental economics could have started the inductive turn off in 
economics.  
                                               
24 We should mention a Web forum especially devoted to discussion in experimental methodology 
promoted by ESA members as a more than welcomed initiative.   
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